From the start, Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion has been underpinned by a robust commitment from its Western partners. The Biden administration’s pledge to support Ukraine “as long as it takes” promised a sustained flow of military and financial aid directly from Washington. This “direct donor” model was key to Ukraine’s initial resilience, providing essential weaponry from U.S. stockpiles.
Biden’s approach primarily involved direct transfers from U.S. weapons inventories, prioritizing speed and ensuring that Ukraine received vital equipment quickly to counter Russian aggression. The American government provided extensive amounts of equipment, from air-defense missiles to artillery rounds and armored vehicles, directly to Kyiv.
Now, under President Trump, the paradigm is shifting. The U.S. is transitioning from a direct donor to a “strategic supplier,” where European allies purchase American weapons for Ukraine at their own expense.
While this reorientation marks a significant change, it is far from the worst-case scenario for Ukraine. Instead, it represents a pragmatic and potentially more sustainable evolution of transatlantic burden-sharing, securing critical capabilities for Ukraine while invigorating the U.S. defense industrial base and recalibrating the nature of allied support. Support is still “as long as it takes” but also “at the others’ expense.”
This marks a departure from the traditional post-World War II donor-recipient model, particularly within the NATO alliance, towards a more transactional “America First” approach. Future U.S. engagement in global security will likely be contingent upon tangible economic benefits and direct cost-sharing from allies. Such a shift could lead to a more predictable, albeit less altruistic, framework for security cooperation, where allies are compelled to demonstrate their commitment through direct financial contributions.
This policy reorientation accelerates European strategic autonomy. While the immediate effect is Europe paying for U.S. weapons, the long-term implication is a forced impetus for greater European defense integration and self-sufficiency. European nations have already been increasing their defense spending and proactively planning for a future with less guaranteed U.S. aid. This new model, by making U.S. weapons available for purchase, encourages Europe to develop its own robust procurement mechanisms and potentially expand its own defense industrial base.
Ukraine’s most pressing and enduring need remains robust air defense against Russia’s escalating missile and drone attacks. The U.S.-made Patriot air-defense system is critical, as it is one of the few systems capable of intercepting high-speed ballistic missiles. These systems are vital for protecting civilian infrastructure and population centers, which have been subjected to relentless Russian bombardment.
A critical strategic reality for Ukraine is that not all American weapons are equally replaceable by European alternatives. While Europe is ramping up its own artillery production, the Patriot system’s unique counter-ballistic missile capability makes it a requirement that only the U.S. can provide at scale.
Europe, at the same time, has demonstrated a clear willingness and increasing capacity to shoulder a greater share of the burden. The European Union has already provided €165 billion in financial assistance and has launched an €800 billion Defense Readiness Plan. Frozen Russian sovereign assets may be used to finance what Ukraine needs.
The shift to a foreign military sales model is explicitly intended to invigorate the U.S. defense industrial base. By integrating “exportability features” into defense systems during the design phase, the U.S. seeks to advance its competitiveness abroad and potentially lower unit costs for both America and its allies.
While the foreign military sales process has historically been slow and plagued by delivery backlogs, the new model offers a potential solution. Consistent, large-scale orders from European allies could provide the long-term contract certainty that the U.S. defense industry requires to invest significantly in surge capacity and overcome challenges. This transforms what was previously a “drain” on American stockpiles, requiring replenishment at taxpayer expense, into a sustained stimulus for U.S. manufacturing, aligning with “America First” economic principles.
This shift is not merely about burden-sharing; it is about recapitalizing and modernizing the U.S. defense industrial base. While immediate fixes for current shortages remain challenging, this strategic reorientation creates a more sustainable industrial ecosystem.
Trump’s recent rhetoric marks a notable change from his earlier stance, which often appeared conciliatory toward Vladimir Putin. He has recognized that Russia, not Ukraine, is the core problem in negotiations, even threatening tariffs and sanctions on Russia and its trading partners if a peace deal is not reached within 50 days. The reality that Putin is not amenable to a quick “deal” is now clear.
There is now a crucial political opening for continued support to Ukraine, even if the funding mechanism changes. The narrative that Trump desires Ukraine’s fall has been refuted. Instead, Trump is committed to ending the war on terms that align with his administration’s interests. This represents a significant psychological advantage for Ukraine, as it lessens the fear of a complete U.S. abandonment.
Maksym Skrypchenko is president of the Transatlantic Dialogue Center.
